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COMMENTS
STATE COURT JURISDICTION OF CLAIMS FOR FEDERAL
PENALTIES, TAXES AND CUSTOMS DUTIES
In view of the clear acknowledgment by the Supreme Court of
the United States that state courts cannot be required to take
jurisdiction of actions by the Federal Government for the enforce-
ment of its penal' and revenue laws, it seems proper to give further
attention to the subject matter of a recent Comment in this LAw
REvmw written for the purpose of demonstrating that a state
court must take jurisdiction of civil actions for the enforcement
by the Federal Government of its penal and revenue laws, unless
the jurisdiction of the federal courts is made exclusive by statute.2
For several hundred years it has been held that the courts of
one government will not enforce the penal and revenue laws of
another government.3
It was the early holding of the state courts which has been
adhered to that one of the United States will not assume jurisdic-
tion of civil actions brought by another of the states to enforce
actions for penalties, including penalties for infraction of the
revenue laws, and to collect taxes.'
1Penal laws referred to herein are those which are -penal in the inter-
national sense. "The question whether a statute of one state, which in
some aspects may be called penal, is a penal law, in the international
sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another state, de-
pends upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offense
against the public justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy -to a
person injured by the wrongful act." Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S.
657, 36 L. Ed. at 1130.
2STATE COURT JuRIsDIcTION OF CLAIms FOR FEDERAL PENALTIES, TAXES
AND CUSTOMS DuTIEs by Alfred J. Schweppe of the Seattle Bar, 11 WAsn. L.
REv., 152. This Comm nt was prompted by a fairly recent decision of the
Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County, which did
not reach the Supreme Court of the State for review, in -the action en-
titled United States of America v. Brewers & Distillers of Vancouver,
Ltd., cause No. 275993. The suit was composed of three causes of action;
the first for the recovery of $10,000,000 in penalties under the customs
laws; the second to recover $6,000,000 in customs duties, and the third
to recover $1,250,000 of Internal Revenue taxes. The court refused juris-
diction of the first cause of action because exclusive jurisdiction thereof
was vested ,by statute (28 U. S. C. A. 371) in the Federal Courts, and
refused to entertain jurisdiction of the second and third causes of action
on the ground that the courts of one sovereign government will not take
jurisdiction of civil actions brought by another government for the
enforcement of its penal and revenue laws, a ground broad enough to
have required the dismissal of the first cause of action also.
sThe Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123, 6 L. ed. 268; Ludlow v. Van
Renssellaer, 1 Johns. 94 (N. Y.); Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 98
Eng. Rep. 1120; Planche v. Fletcher, 1 Doug. 251, 99 Eng. Rep. 164;
Bristow v. Sequeville, 5 Ex. 275, 155 Eng. Rep. 118; Atty. Gen. for Canada
v. Wan. Schulze & Co., 9 Scots Law Times Reports 4; Municipal Council
of Sydney v. Bull (1909) 1 K. B. 7; Indian & General Inv. Trust, Ltd.
v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., (1920) 1 K. B. 539; The Eva, 126 L. T. 223;
In re Visser, (1928) 1 Ch. 877; Reg. v. McVey, 23 Ont. Weekly Notes 32;
DIcEY, CONFLICTS OF LAws, (5th ed.), p. 212. Cases from the federal and
state courts are collected in Notes 4 and 5.
-'Penal actions--Scoville v. Canfield, 14 Johns. 338; Delafield v. State
of Ill., 2 Hill 159; Teall v. Felton, 1 N. Y. 156; Henry v. Sargent, 13
N. H. 321, 40 Am Dec. 146; Allegheny v. Allen, 55 Atl. 724 (N. J.)
STORY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS, § 621; Cook, Vol. 1, p. 720, § 223; Actions
to collect revenue--Henry v. Sargent, 13 N. H. 321, 40 Am. Dec. 146;
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Nor will the federal courts take jurisdiction of similar actions
brought by the states.'
That the state and federal governments are separate and distinct
sovereignties has been established beyond question.
"In Abelman v. Booth, 21 How. 523, 16 L. ed. 175,
Chief Justice Taney described in plain language the com-
plex nature of our government as the existence of two
distinct and separate sovereignties within the same terri-
torial space, each of them restricted in its powers and
each within the sphere of action prescribed by the Con-
stitution of the United States, independent of the other." 6
See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588.
The same right to refuse jurisdiction has therefore been exer-
cised by the state courts in regard to suits by the federal govern-
ment for the enforcement of its penal and revenue laws, and this
refusal has been approved by the Supreme Court of the United
States. *While in the early history of the United States the federal
government by legislation provided that its revenue laws might
be enforced in the state courts, the greater number of the state
courts refused to assume jurisdiction and thus rendered these
laws practically ineffective.7
In regard to such a statute, 8 Kent in his Commentaries, at
page 404 states:
"After these decisions in Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky and
New York the Act of Congress of 3d of March, 1815 C.
100, may be considered as essentially nugatory. That act
vested in the state courts concurrently with the federal
courts cognizance of all 'complaints, suits and prosecu-
tions for taxes, duties, fines, penalties and forfeitures
arising and payable under any Act of Congress passed
or to be passed for the collection of any direct tax or
internal duties.' "
It was undoubtedly because this law was thus rendered nugatory
that it was dropped from the laws of the United States and never
carried into the Revised Statutes of 1873.
State of Md. v. Turner, and Mayor of Baltimore v. same, 132 N. Y. S.
173; Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 42 N. E. at 423; In re Bliss'
Estate, 202 N. Y. S. 185; Matter of Hollins, 139 N. Y. S. 713; State of
Colorado v. Harbeck, 133 N. E. 357; In re Martin's Estate, 240 N. Y.
S. 393.
OActions for Penalties-Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 672, 36 L. ed.
1123; Southern Ry. Co. v. State, 75 N. E. 272 (Ind.); Virginia v. Paul,
148 U. S. 107, 37 L. ed. 386; United Breweries v. Colby, 170 Fed. 1008;
Perkins v. B. & A. R. Co., 90 Fed. 321; Stichtenoth v. Central Stock &
Grain Exchange of Chicago, 90 Fed. 1; Hamilton v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing
Co., et al., 100 Fed. 675. Actions for revenue--Moore v. Mitchell, 30
F. (2d) 600 (2nd Circuit), aff. on another ground, 281 U. S. 18, 74 L. ed.
673, 50 S. Ct. 175.
'Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. ed. 449.
1U. S. v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4, (N. Y.); Jackson v. Rose, 2 Va. Cas.
34; Davison v. Champlain, 7 Conn. 244; Haney v. Sharp, 1 Dana (Ky.)
442; Ward v. Jenkins, 10 Metcalf (Mass.) 583; State v. Pike, 15 N. H.
83; Newell v. Natl. Bank of Somerset, 75 Ky. 57; Delafield v. State of
Ill., 2 Hill. 159 (N. Y.); Teall v. Felton, 1 N. Y. 156.
83 Stat. at L. 244, 1815.
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The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly recog-
nized that the courts of a state cannot be compelled to assume
jurisdiction of civil actions for the enforcement of the federal
revenue laws. In Hamilton v. Attrill,9 the court stated:
"Upon the question what are to be considered penal
laws of one country, within the international rule which
forbids such laws to be enforced in any other country,
so much reliance was placed by each party in argument
upon the opinion of this court in Wisconsin v. Pelican
Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, that it will be convenient to quote
from that opinion the principal propositions there
affirmed:
'The rule that the courts of no country execute the
penal laws of another applies not only to prosecutions
and sentences for crimes' and misdemeanors, but to all
suits in favor of the state for the recovery of pecuniary
penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection
of its revenue, or other municipal laws and to all judg-
ments for such penalties.' p. 290....
"Upon similar grounds, the courts of a state cannot
be compelled to take jurisdiction of a suit to recover a
like penalty for a violation of a law of the United States.
Martin v. Hunter, 14 U. S. 304, 330, 337; U. S. v.
Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4; Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill. 159,
169; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Va. Cas. 34; Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn.
239; Davison v. Champlin, 7 Conn. 244; Haney v. Sharp,
1 Dana 442; State v. Pike, 15 N. H. 83, 85; Ward v.
Jenkins, 10 Met. 583, 587, 1 KNiT. Com. 402-404."
It will be noted that in this case the Court reaffirmed the
principle earlier stated in the cited case of Wiconsin v. Pelican
Insurance Co.
That the assumption of jurisdiction by state courts over such
actions as are here being considered cannot be forced is clearly
recognized by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Kentucky v.
Dennison.0
"It is true that in the early days of the government,
Congress relied with confidence upon the cooperation and
support of the states, when exercising the legitimate
powers of the general government, and were accustomed
to receive it, upon principles of comity, and from a
sense of mutual and common interest, where no such duty
was imposed by the Constitution. And laws were passed
authorizing state courts to entertain jurisdiction in pro-
ceedings by the United States to recover penalties and
forfeitures incurred by breaches of their revenue laws,
and giving to the state courts the same authoritiy with
the district court of the United States to enforce such
penalties and forfeitures, and also the power to hear
the allegations of parties, and to take proofs, if an
application for a remission of the penalty or forfeiture
'146 U. S. 657, 36 L. ed. 1123 at 1129.
"*65 U. S. 66, 16 L. ed. 717.
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should be made, according to the provisions of the acts
of Congress. And these powers were for some years exer-
cised by state tribunals, readily, and without objection,
until in some of the states it was declined because it inter-
fered with and retarded the performance of duties which
properly belonged to them as state courts; and in other
states, doubts appear to have arisen as to the power of
the courts, acting under the authority of the state to
inflict these penalties and forfeitures for offenses against
the general government, unless especially authorized to
do so by the state.
"And in these cases the cooperation of the states was
a matter of comity, which the several sovereignties ex-
tended to one another for their mutual benefit. It was
not regarded by either party as an obligation imposed by
the Constitution. And the Acts of Congress conferring
the jurisdiction merely give the power to the state tri-
buras, but do not purport to regard it as a duty, and
they leave it to the states to exercise it or not, as might
best comport with. their own sense of justice, and their
own interest and convenience."
And in United States v. Jones11 the court stated:
"At different times, various duties have been imposed
by Act of Congress on state tribunals; they have been
invested with jurisdiction in civil suits and over com-
plaints' and prosecutions for fines, penalties and for-
feitures arising under laws of the United States. 1 Kent
400, and though the jurisdiction thus conferred could
not be enforced against the consent of the state; yet when
its exercise was not incompatible with state duties, and
the state made no objection to it, the decisions rendered
by the state tribunals were upheld."
The foregoing statements by the Supreme Court have never
been repudiated nor their effect lessened. None of the cases relied
on by the Comment above referred to12 involved actions wherein
enforcement of the penal or revenue laws of the United States
was held mandatory.'3 The Comment relies to a great extent
upon Claflin v. Houseman,4 Second Employers' Liability Cases,'
and Houston v. Moore.16 Authoritative references to these cases
demonstrate that they cannot be relied upon as a basis for the
point that the states must accept jurisdiction of actions brought
by the federal government for the enforcement of its revenue
laws. For instance, the Supreme Court obviously disposes of the
11109 U. S. 513, 28 L. ed. 1015 at 1018.
'11 WA SH.L. REv. 152.
'3For instance: Claflin v. Houseman (Note 14)-actidn by assignee in
bankruptcy to recover a preference; Houston v. Moore (Note 16) Volun-
tary action of a state itself before a court-martial to punish a state
militiaman for failure to report for duty. Second Employers' Liability
Cases, (Note 15)-personal injury suits under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.
"93 U. S. 130, 23 L. ed. 833.
"223 U. S. 1, 56 L. ed. 327.
2618 U. S. 1, 5 L. ed. 19.
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Claflin case as authority for any such proposition in Huntington
v. Attrill, 7 stating:
" 'The rule that the courts of no country execute the
penal laws of another applies not only to prosecutions
and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all
suits in favor of the state for the recovery of pecuniary
penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection
of its revenue, or other municipal laws and to all judg-
ments for such penalties.' p. 290 .....
"Upon similar grounds, the courts of a state cannot be
compelled to take jurisdiction of a suit to recover a like
penalty for a violation of a law of the United States.
Martin v. Hunter, 14 U. S. 304, 330, 337; U. S. v.
Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4; Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill. 159,
169; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Va. Cas. 34; Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn.
239; Davison v. Champlin, 7 Conn. 244; Haney v. Sharp,
1 Dana, 442; State v. Pike, 15 N. H. 83, 85; Ward v.
Jenkins, 10 Met. 583, 587, 1 KENT, Com. 402-404. The
only ground ever suggested for. maintaining such suits
in a state court is that the laws of the United States are
in effect laws of each state. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S.
130, 137; Platt, J., in United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns.
22; Ordway v. Central Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 47 Md.
217. But in Claflin v. Houseman the point adjudged was
that an assignee under the bankrupt law of the United
States could assert in a state court the title vested in him
by the assignment in bankruptcy; and Mr. Justice Brad-
ley, who'deliver-ed the opinion in that case, said the year
before, when sitting in the circuit court, and speaking of
a prosecution in a court of the state of Georgia for
perjury committed in that state in testifying before a
commissioner of the circuit court of the United States, 'It
would be a Manifest incongruity for one sovereignty to
punish a person for an offense committed against the
laws of another sovereignty.' Ex parte Bridges, 2 Wood
428, 430. See also Re Loney, 134 U. S. 372."
And the editor of Cases on Constitutional Law"' notes an
exception to the rule of the Second Employers' Liability Cases,
stating in a footnote to those cases:
"It was an early practice, generally acquiesced in by
the states, for the United States to give to the state courts
jurisdiction of suits for the enforcement of the federal
revenue laws. . . . Some of the state courts refused to
exercise this jurisdiction, U. S. v. Lathrop, 17 Johns.
(N. Y.) 4 (1819) ; Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn. 239 (1828) ; and
this refusal was approved in Huntington v. Attrill, 146
U. S. 657, 672, 13 S. Ct. 224, 36 L. ed. 1123 (1892), upon
the ground that one sovereign could not be compelled too
enforce the penal laws of another."
"See Note 9.
1H.AIL, CAsEs OF CoNsTrzmONAL LAw, 1926, at p. 953.
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In Houston v. Moore,19 there was involved no question of the
right of a state court to refuse jurisdiction of an action. The
majority of the court found the punishment there inflicted by a
state court-martial was in fact also imposed by state law and the
state in practically re-enacting the federal law on the subject had
chosen to entertain the suit.'0 Furthermore, Mr. Justice Story in
dissenting, stated:
"It cannot be pretended that the states have retained
any power to enforce fines and penalties created by the
laws of the United States in virtue of their general sov-
ereignty, for that sovereignty did not originally attach
on such subjects .....
"It is a general principle, too, in the policy, if not the
customary law of nations, that no nation is bound to
enforce the penal laws of another within its own domin-
ions. The authority naturally belongs and is confided,
to the tribunals of the nation creating the offenses. In a
government formed like ours, where there-is a division
of sovereignty, and, of course, where there is a danger
of collision from the near approach of powers to a conflict
with each other, it would seem a peculiarly safe and
salutary rule, that each government should be left to
enforce its own penal laws in its own tribunals. It has
been expressly held, by this court, that no part of the
criminal jurisdiction of the United States can consistently
with the Constitution be delegated by congress to state
tribunals; (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 337; S. P.
United States vs. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4) and there is not
the slightest inclination to retract that opinion. The
judicial power of the Union clearly extends to all such
cases. No concurrent power is retained by the states,
because the subject matter derives its existence from the
Constitution; and the authority of congress to delegate
it cannot be implied, for it is not necessary or proper in
any constitutional sense."
In repudiating jurisdiction of actions for taxes courts are not
refusing to enforce a debt but are refusing to exercise the force
and authority which rightfully should be exercised by the gov-
ernment imposing the tax.
"Taxes are not debts. It was so held by this court in
the case of Lane County v. Oregon, reported in 74 U. S.
71. Debts are obligations for the payment of money
founded upon contract, express or implied. Taxes are
imposts levied for the support of the government or for
some special purpose authorized by it." Meriwether v.
Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. ed. 197.
In the case of Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. (2d) 600, (Second
Circuit) the court stated:
"9See Note 16.
"Even the restricted holding In this case was questioned in the
Claflin case wherein the court stated in regard to it: "Justice Story and
Johnson dissented; and perhaps the court went further in that case than
it would now." 23 L. ed. at 840.
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"Taxes are imposts, not debts, collected for the support
of the government. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S.
472, 26 L. ed. 197. The form of procedure to collect them
cannot change their character. No contractual or quasi
contractual obligation to pay arises out of the indebted-
ness. The enforcement of revenue laws rests not on
consent but on force and authority."
Furthermore, penalties in favor of a government and taxes are
among the provisions for the public order of a state which another
state should not be required to pass upon. As stated by Judge
Learned Hand in the case of Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. (2d) 600
(Second Circuit), wherein it was held that the federal court
should not exercise jurisdiction of an action by a state for taxes,
"To pass upon the provisions for the public order of
another state is, or at any rate should be, beyond the
powers of a court; it involves the relations between the
states themselves, with which courts are incompetent to
deal, and which are entrusted to other authority ....
Revenue laws fall within the same reasoning; they affect
a state in matters as vital to its existence as its criminal
law."
And in a case relating to the collection of penalties connected
with revenue laws, the court in State of Arkansas v. Bowen, 21
stated in reference to penal and revenue laws:
"Such laws relating to the domestic economy of a state
and to the management of its domestic affairs, are to be
enforced directly by the courts of the state which enacts
the law, and not by the courts of other jurisdictions.
"This rule prevails under the international law between
nations, and it has been held repeatedly that it prevails
in the United States as between the states, and is not
within the provision of the Constitution of the United
States which provides:
'That the judgments of the courts of any state are to
have such faith and credit given them in every court
within the U. S. as they have by law or usage in the state
in which they were rendered.'
"This does not relate to actions to recover penalties and
fines, nor to actions authorized by statutes relating
directly to the collection of the revenues of a state, or
the enforcement of fines, penalties and forfeitures for non
compliance with or violation of such statutes."
The same principle has been established in the RESTATEmngr,
CONFMCT OF LAWS, p. 724 et seq., as follows:
"Topic 4. Access to Courts.
Scope Note: Although a state may have jurisdiction,
as the word is defined in No. 42, to act judicially in a
certain case or class of cases, it may not do so, either
because the particular court exercises its discretion not to
exercise jurisdiction in the case before it, or because Df
"9 Mackey, 291, (Dist. of Col.) aff. 3 App. Cases D. C. 537.
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a wider policy not to exercise judicial jurisdiction in a
general class of cases. ...
"No. 610. Action on Foreign Public Right.
No action can be maintained on a right created by the
law of a foreign state as a method of furthering its own
governmental interests ...
c. No action can be maintained by a foreign state to
enforce its license or revenue laws, or claim for taxes.
Illustration:
2. By the law of State X, a license fee of $5 is due from
every person who builds a house. A, domiciled in state Y,
builds a house in X. X sues A in Y for the license fee.
The suit will .be dismissed....
No. 611. Action for a penalty.
No action can be maintained to recover a penalty, the
right to which is given by the law of another state."
The cases cited in the Comment referred to, rely upon the
provision of the U. S. Constitution, Art. VI, providing that the
Constitution and laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land and
"the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstand-
ing." But it has never been supposed that this provision requires
a state court to take jurisdiction of every action involving a federal
law. It will be noted that in the quotation from Wisconsin v.
Pelican Insurance Co., supra at Note 13, that the Supreme Court
repudiated this provision of the Constitution as a basis for requir-
ing state courts to entertain federal court actions to enforce the
revenue laws of the United States. Furthermore, there are vast
fields based on federal laws of which the state courts, notwith-
standing the above mentioned article of the Constitution, cannot
assume jurisdiction.
"No part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United
States can, consistently with the Constitution, be dele-
gated to state tribunals. The admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction is of the same exclusive cognizance; and it
can only be in those cases where, previous to the Constitu-
tion, state tribunals possessed jurisdiction independent of
national authority, that they can now constitutionally
exercise a concurrent jurisdiction."22
Article VI of the Constitution is no more imperative in its
terms than Article IV, § 1 which commands that "full faith and
credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings of every other state." Notwithstanding this
latter provision the Supreme Court has held that one state need
not entertain jurisdiction of a suit in favor of another state for
the enforcement of revenue laws.
" 'The rule that the courts of no country execute the
penal laws of another applies not only to prosecutions and
sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits
in favor of the state for the recovery of pecuniary penal-
"Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed. 97 at 105.
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ties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its
revenue, or other municipal laws and to all judgments for
such penalties.' p. 290.
'The application of the rule to the courts of the several
states and of the United States is not affected by the pro-
visions of the Constitution and of the Act of Congress,
by which the judgments of the courts of any state are to
have such faith and credit given to them in every court
within the United States as they have by law or usage in
the state in which they were rendered.'...,,23_
See also the quotation from Arkansas v. Bowen, supra."
And as stated above the state courts have almost uniformly
refused jurisdiction of suits under the penal and revenue laws of
other states.2
1
The class of cases here being considered constitute an exception
to those which the Constitution requires a state to entertain,
"These provisions of the Constitution, (Art. IV, § 1)
and laws of the United States are necessarily to be read
in the light of some established principles, which they
were not intended to overthrow. They give no effect to
judgments of a court which had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter or of the parties. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52
U. S. 165; Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U. S. 457. And they
confer no new jurisdiction on the courts of any state;
and therefore do not authorize them to take jurisdiction
of a suit or prosecution of such a penal nature, that it
cannot, on settle rules of public and international law,
be entertained by the judiciary of any other state than
that in which the penalty was incurred. Wisconsin v.
Pelican Ins. Co. above cited.' '26
In DJelafield v. State of Iii., 2 Hill (N. Y.) 159, the court stated:
"Again, crimes are only punishable by the government
against which they are committed and the state courts
will not enforce the penal laws of the United States or
of any other state. This rests on a general principle
wholly independent of the federal Constitution. U. S. v.
Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4."
The conclusion upon the subject here discussed must be:
1. That one government cannot as a matter of right recover
monetary penalties and taxes in the courts of another.
2. This principle applies to suits by the federal government in
the state court notwithstanding Art. VI of the United States
Constitution providing that the laws of the United States are "the
supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be
bound thereby. " 27
D, WrT WMIiAMS.*
"Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 at 685, 36 L. ed. 1123 at 1139.
"See quotation at Note 21.
"See cases collected In Note 4.
"Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 36 L. ed. 1123.
"Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 36 L. Ed. 1123; Wisconsin v.
Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. ed. 239.
*Of the Seattle Bar.
